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Japan's Dance with the Dragon and the Bear Mayumi Fukushima W ith a lame-duck president in office, the modus operandi for US diplomacy toward Asia this year may be simply to avoid any negative outcomes and expend minimum efforts. Since the crisis in Ukraine flared up, the Obama administration has been pressuring Japan not to pursue a rapprochement with Russia.
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Carnegie Fellowship to Fravel
MIT political scientist Taylor Fravel received a Carnegie Fellowship for the 2016-17 academic year. He will use the award to extend his studies of Asia's ongoing maritime disputes.
Bustani Seminar Turns 30
The Emile Bustani Middle East Seminar at MIT celebrated its 30th anniversary this academic year. For the spring semester, the seminar included two lectures on contemporary Middle East affairs.
In government, I was too busy to stay up on the academic literature. The main thing the fellowship has allowed me to do is to catch up on the archival materials that weren't available then and to catch up on the secondary literature. I spent the fall revising and updating the manuscript and it is now under peer review.
précis: What are the key insights of the book?
PH: Kennan was profoundly influential in the direction of Japan and China policy after World War II. This was thanks to secretary of state George Marshall. He largely delegated to Kennan policy formulation not just toward the Soviet Union but to the rest of the world. Kennan was the primary driver of the policy of disengagement from the Chinese civil war. He was even more influential on Japan policy. He was instrumental in the redirection of US occupation policy from demilitarization and punishment toward economic reconstruction.
On the other hand, I criticize Kennan for dismissing the strategic importance of China, which he did for the most of the rest of his life. Kennan was also inconsistent and impractical in his application of the defensive perimeter concept in East Asia.
Kennan basically declared that mainland Asia was strategically irrelevant to us. Even if the Soviets did take Asia, it didn't matter because it posed no threat to the US.
During the Korea and Indochina conflicts, Kennan was never able to reconcile the conflict between his strategic assessment of the importance of these countries-which he thought was marginal-and his belief that US prestige and credibility could not be compromised.
The most interesting case is Korea. He said we should get out of Korea. But immediately after the invasion in June 1950 he agreed that we had to intervene.
Vietnam was a different case. He excluded it from US interests. He was saying in 1948 and '49: Whatever you do, don't inherit this from the French. And 15 years later, he became a very prominent critic of the US involvement in Vietnam.
précis: What are the implications for today's policymakers?
PH: Even though some of his assessments and answers were proven wrong, Kennan was always asking the right questions about the limits of our ability to influence East Asia and the resources we can bring to bear about events there.
Even though he denied that containment was applicable on the mainland of Asia, he did pursue a version of containment on its periphery. I think it is still operative in our approach to the region. He didn't think we needed to contain Soviet influence in China-to him, containment was exclusively about the Soviets-but he eventually wanted to push back against précis an extension of Chinese influence in the western Pacific. And that's what the Chinese today call containment. He was also correct in assessing the challenges of latching ourselves to feckless allies.
Kennan always knew that there would be a dilemma with the Japanese because their interests are not identical to ours and they don't like to be taken for granted. They've got their own agenda. They're very ambivalent about us.
précis: You were national intelligence officer for East Asia during a critical time. What has surprised you most about regional developments there?
PH: What surprised me most was the complexity of the impact of the rise of China on the way other countries in the region view the relative importance of China and the United States. The conventional wisdom is that China is pushing the envelope and the rest of the region is aligning with the United States against it. The problem is that the rest of the region is ambivalent about the United States-and there's a lot of maneuvering and hedging going on. I think that the regional response to both China and the US rebalance is partly a contest in which the Chinese are trying to exploit the other countries' uncertainties about the rebalance.
I think this is a factor even in the minds of our closest friends and allies in the region. Fravel told MIT News he was "thrilled, humbled, and honored" to be receiving the fellowship, which is worth up to $200,000. The award, announced today by the Carnegie Corporation of New York, supports "research and writing aimed at addressing some of the world's most urgent challenges to U.S. democracy and international order," and focuses on scholars in the social sciences and humanities.
"It is tremendous to have this opportunity to research and write," says Fravel, who will be on leave from MIT during the forthcoming year. The Carnegie fellowship will enable Fravel to pursue a new project in which he will look in more detail at the maritime disputes that have emerged in Asia over the last several years. China has been at odds with other countries over territorial claims to a series of small islands-including the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, also claimed in whole or in part by Vietnam, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei.
"Since the first book came out, China's [maritime] disputes have become much more active," says Fravel, who adds he will be "trying to put those events in a broader context." Modest as the stakes over the islands might seem on the surface, they are intertwined with larger political dynamics in the region. For this reason and others, Fravel's expertise has been in increasing demand recently, among scholars, policymakers, and other foreign-policy professionals. Fravel says more time for research will enable him to better "survey and examine the various conflict management tools that can help prevent escalation" of these disputes. Those tools potentially include international arbitration, codes of conduct among claimants in the disputes, and arms-control-style agreements among countries to limit activities such as troop deployments. This January the program awarded $2,006,906 to MIT faculty to cover international travel, meeting, and workshop costs. Managed by MIT International Science and Technology Initiatives (MISTI), the GSF enables participating MIT teams to partner with international peers with the goal of developing and launching joint projects. Many of the joint projects lead to publications, additional grant awards and the development of valuable long-term relationships between international researchers and MIT faculty and students. Applicants are encouraged to include MIT undergraduate and graduate students in their projects.
In the 2015-2016 grant cycle, 86 projects-out of 214 applications-were awarded funding by MISTI GSF. This cycle's winning faculty and research scientists represent four MIT schools and 22 departments across the Institute. MISTI GSF consists of a general pool of funds for projects in any country and several country-specific funds. In the latest grant cycle, MISTI supported collaborations in 24 unique countries through 21 individual MISTI seed funds, including the newest funds: MIT-Brazil Lemann Seed Fund for Collaborative Projects, MIT-Germany-University of Stuttgart Seed Fund, MIT-Israel Seed Fund, and MIT-Peru Seed Fund. Click to see this year's GSF grantees.
The MIT-Imperial College London Seed Fund, administered by MISTI, was also launched this year through a partnership between the MIT Office of the Provost and Imperial College London. The MIT-Imperial College Seed Fund primarily supports travel costs for exchange between teams at MIT and Imperial College London, and grants range between $30,000 and $50,000 for an 18-month project period. Winners will be announced on the MISTI site in mid-March. précis R ussian president Vladimir Putin has insisted that he and a small group of top officials decided spontaneously to invade Crimea after the departure of Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych on February 22, 2014. Critics of Russia and those inclined to take a Cold War perspective have claimed, by contrast, that the invasion of Crimea represents an inherently expansionist move on Russia's part, perhaps one long contemplated. A third explanation proposed by Western observers, including a number of foreign policy experts, suggests that the Russian leadership was essentially forced into taking Crimea and potentially Ukraine because of Western aggression and moves into the buffer zone around Russia. Delving deeply into the sources available on the crisis, the four chapters in this book strive to understand the roots of Russian involvement in a more nuanced way. Ultimately, the four perspectives suggest that all three claims are at best insufficient and at worst deeply flawed.
The authors in this volume take different perspectives on the crisis in Crimea and Ukraine, addressing both international causes and conditions and domestic factors. Combining expertise in diplomacy, law, history, and journalism, as well as both American and Russian viewpoints, they address a number of core questions: What motivated the Russian leadership to send troops into Crimea and then declare that Crimea had formally chosen to "join" Russia? Even before actual violence broke out, what were the sources of conflict with Ukraine over European Union (EU) membership and trade in the preceding months? What domestic challenges inside Russia encouraged the Kremlin to take an expansionist stance toward Crimea? What does that expansionism say about Russian political, economic, and social priorities in this historical moment? And what role did the Russian president's personal position play in the deepening of the crisis [...] The EuroMaidan uprising in the fall of 2013 brought Ukrainians of many different political views together in the leading square of Kyiv to protest President Yanukovych's decision not to sign the Association Agreement proposed by the EU, as well as to protest domestic corruption and repression. The Association Agreement contained a broad number of points of cooperation between the EU and Ukraine, including agreements on economic relations and free trade; industrial cooperation; gradual moves toward visa-free movement; exchange of information, especially in legal spheres; access to the European Investment Bank; and modernization of Ukraine's energy sector. Although the protesters were not pleased with Yanukovych and made their dissatisfaction visible and audible in protests and chants, they were not initially seeking his ouster (whatever later Russian sources may have claimed). However, once the decision was made to use violence against the protesters, the stakes were raised and the protesters became much more virulently anti-Yanukovych.
On the night of February 21-22, 2014, Yanukovych fled the country and his security services melted away. Vladimir Putin claimed in October 2014 and again in March 2015 that Yanukovych's flight was the precipitating event in what is usually referred to as the Russian annexation of Crimea. Certainly, Yanukovych's ouster created problems for Russia, but to most Western observers it does not explain why Russian forces would choose to invade Crimea, stage a referendum, and declare Crimea to be part of Russia. Putin's own justification has rested on claiming to "protect" Russia's "fellow citizens" précis (sootechestvenniki), though there is no evidence of harm to Russians in Crimea from anyone in the Maidan.
In fact, there is evidence that preparations for some kind of action in Crimea began from the start of the Maidan uprising in late November 2013. Russian media immediately began broadcasting extensive anti-Maidan programs, playing on the fears of those in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. Pro-Russian groups in the Crimean parliament intensified their insistence that Crimea secede from Ukraine and join Russia. By December 12, pro-Russian forces were claiming that it was time to create "self-defense" units in Crimea and southeastern Ukraine. On December 14, the leaders of two pro-Russian groups, Gennadi Basov of the Russian Bloc and Sergei Aksyonov of Russian Unity, met with Vyacheslav Svitlychny, the Russian consul general in Crimea, and declared that they were preparing an anti-Maidan demonstration to demand Crimea's secession from Ukraine. In late January 2014, Crimean pro-Russian groups held demonstrations in several cities, burning EU flags and blaming the United States, the EU, and NATO for the crisis. The Night Wolves motorcycle band and local Cossack groups, numbering some 700 to 800, joined forces as the "Slavic shield" (slavianskii shchit), they claimed, to guard key buildings in Sevastopol.
The top Russian elite now became visibly involved. On January 27-29, the chair of the Crimean parliament, Vladimir Konstantinov, met with Putin's advisor Vladislav Surkov in Moscow. On January 30, Russian Duma deputy Aleksei Zhuravlev, who had revived the nationalist party Rodina (Motherland) in 2012, announced the creation of a new "Slavic Anti-Fascist Front" (Slavianskii anti-fashistskii front). On February 3, Zhuravlev came to Crimea to hold the opening congress of this new group, which claimed to bring together over thirty different organizations, including the ROK, the Congress of Russian Communities, and Ukraine's Russian Unity political party. They listed their goals as serving as "a counterweight to the anti-constitutional, fascist uprising" in Ukraine, the defense of the interests of the Russian-speaking people of Ukraine, and the formation of public opinion for Ukraine to join the Eurasian Customs Union. In an interview on February 6, Zhuravlev explained that they had had no troubles at their opening meeting because they were already organized in Crimea in strong militias.
On February 4, the Crimean parliament announced that it would seek a referendum on the "status of Crimea" and would appeal to the president of the Russian Federation for "the defense and autonomy" of Crimea. Vladislav Surkov appeared in Crimea again on February 14, and Vladimir Konstantinov traveled to Moscow again on February 19. Although no one knows what they spoke about, the presence of such high-level Russian officials, especially one responsible for policy in this area (Surkov), suggests that the Russian leaders were at a minimum closely monitoring the situation in this region and may have been involved in further agitation.
No sooner had Yanukovych fled on February 22 than pro-Russian Crimeans began to hold demonstrations and form militias. In Sevastopol, a crowd of 20,000 demonstrators demanded a new mayor, Aleksei Chalyi, a Russian citizen known for his outspoken proRussian views. Thousands turned out in the streets of both Simferopol and Sevastopol, organized in large measure by the Night Wolves motorcyclists. Night Wolves' leader Dmitry Sinichkin, dressed in the group's trademark black leather, announced that in his view, "Bloodshed is inevitable." Chalyi and pro-Russian crowds in Sevastopol welcomed the Ukrainian secret police, the infamous Berkut, which only recently had been disbanded by the new Ukrainian government for their attacks on the Maidan demonstrators.
On February 27, armed men without any evident insignia seized the buildings of the Crimean government and parliament, raising the Russian flag. A new prime minister, Sergei Aksyonov, was "elected" by the deputies who were in the occupied building. W ith a lame-duck president in office, the modus operandi for US diplomacy toward Asia this year may be simply to avoid any negative outcomes and expend minimum effort. Since the crisis in Ukraine flared up, the Obama administration has been pressuring Japan not to pursue a rapprochement with Russia. Yet Prime Minister Shinzo Abe had a summit meeting with President Putin in Sochi, a resort town in southwestern Russia, in early May. Abe has been encouraging Putin to visit Japan before the end of this year in order for the two leaders to resolve long-pending territorial disputes between their countries once and for all. Doing so, Abe hopes, should improve security environments in the northern area of Japan and allow Tokyo to concentrate its military resources on patrolling the East and South China Seas. As Figure 1 shows, Russian forces have accounted for more than half of foreign aircraft against which Japanese Air Self-Defense Force scrambled because they were threatening or violating Japanese airspace. More importantly, Russian military aircraft have recently become increasingly active, as China grows more assertive in areas surrounding Japan. And as is clear in Figure 2 , Russian military aircraft appear to be threatening Japanese airspace from all directions.
Under such circumstances, it is understandable that Japan wants to do something to improve its security environments. In the meantime, Russia is growing increasingly close to and dependent on China. Indeed, the familiar Sino-Russian relationship of decades ago has been turned on its head. The single state most affected by this change is perhaps Japan. At least for the time being, Russia's weakness vis-à-vis China actually renders a comprehensive territorial agreement between Tokyo and Moscow extremely unlikely for reasons I will discuss below. Japan therefore should shelve its territorial disputes and instead strike a more limited bargain with Russia, so that it can focus on the main threat of China.
Sino-Russian political and military relations
Journalists often call Russia and China "frenemies." On the one hand, their political and military relationships have appeared to grow closer than ever. Chinese President Xi Jinping chose Russia as the first country to visit on becoming president in 2013. All of their territorial disputes had been resolved by 2015. The two countries conducted On the other hand, their vast common land border is a constant source of mistrust, as the Russian side is sparsely populated and rich with raw materials, the Chinese side full of people. Many of Russia's tactical nuclear weapons are pointed at China. It is true that China and Russia are still tussling for influence, especially in Central Asia and the Arctic Ocean. Russia warily watches China's "One Belt, One Road" policy, which seeks to consolidate Beijing's influence over Central Asia. China's maritime expansion into the Arctic Ocean seems to be another source of concern for Russia, as China develops a new route for seaborne transportation going through Russian territorial or contiguous waters in the Arctic Ocean.
Sino-Russian economic relations
The concept of "frenemies" is at odds with Sino-Russian economic relations, however. The two countries' trade volume quadrupled between 2004 and 2014, with a record of $95 billion in 2014. While it dropped by 27.8% to $64 billion in 2015 due to a worldwide economic disruption, it is still three times their trade volume in 2004. Russia exports far more oil to China than ever before through a recently constructed ESPO pipeline, which goes from Eastern Siberia toward the Pacific Ocean. China and Russia struck a gas deal worth $400 billion in May 2014 for Russia's Gazprom to supply Siberian gas to China through a pipeline between 2018 and 2048.
But looking at their respective lists of other important trade partners gives us a different picture of their economic relations. From the Russian perspective, China is by far its biggest trading partner in the world, followed by the Netherlands and Germany, whereas from the Chinese perspective Russia is just the ninth largest trading partner. China's most important trading partners are the United States, Hong Kong, and Japan. Most of China's fuel supplies come from Australia and the Middle East, and Russia's share in the Northeast Asian gas market is unlikely to exceed 3% in the next decade and by 2030 will be no more than 9%. As long as Russia remains a resource-based economy with its underdeveloped service sector, we should expect its dependence on China to continue. This is why China squeezed such a favorable gas deal out of Russia's Gazprom in 2014.
précis

Overall Sino-Russian relations
How do we understand overall Sino-Russian relations, then? Russian economic dependence on China seems to largely override any tendency of "frenemies" competing for larger influence in Central Asia and the Arctic Ocean.
Russia's economic problems, especially those in Russia's Far East, are far more serious than the problem of Russia's declining status as a military power. In 2014, as the price of oil collapsed, the countries of central and eastern Europe continued to wean themselves off Russian gas. Slow global growth further reduced the appetite for Russian natural resources, and the West imposed sanctions on Moscow in the aftermath of Crimea. The ruble lost nearly half of its value against the U.S. dollar since 2014, and the Russian economy was shrinking by nearly four percent in 2015.
As Russia's economic problems run deep, President Putin seems increasingly concerned about the Russian Far East, where its population dropped by more than 20% since 1990 and is holding the Russian economy back. In addition, economic stagnation in regions far from Russia's center could have politically destabilizing effects, which President Putin fears most. All of these problems leave President Putin with few options other than to rely on China. As long as record-low oil prices and the West's economic sanctions against Russia persist, Moscow cannot afford to lose the Chinese market.
Implications of the current Sino-Russian Relations for Japan
Unfortunately, the single state most affected by recent changes in Sino-Russian relations is perhaps Japan. Since the Cold War ended, Japanese leaders have consistently sought to resolve territorial disputes with Russia regarding the so-called Northern Territories (hopporyodo) in order to conclude a Russian-Japanese peace treaty. In particular, the current prime minister, Abe, appears much more determined than his predecessors to achieve a diplomatic breakthrough with Russia.
What explains Abe's determination? First, he seems to assume that given Russia's isolation after the crisis of Crimea, President Putin is currently more willing than he would be otherwise to make significant concessions in order to find reliable friends. Second, Abe believes that improved bilateral relations between Russia and Japan would have restraining effects on China's ever-increasing maritime adventurism. Indeed, in the face of President Obama's concerns, Tokyo justifies its high-level contacts with Moscow in the midst of the crisis in Ukraine with the logic of balancing: Better relations between Moscow and Tokyo could prevent Russia from getting too close to China. Finally, Abe sees a window of opportunity opening in Japanese politics. Since Abe came to power in 2012, political opposition has been weak. As any peaceful resolution of the territorial disputes with Russia would require significant concessions from the Japanese side, powerful opposition parties would make it more difficult even for someone labeled a nationalist, such as Abe, to justify concessions. With the same rationale, Tokyo also hopes that President Putin's high approval ratings in Russia equip him to make big concessions.
Perhaps Abe is right to assume that President Putin covets closer relations with Japan. From the Russian perspective, this could improve Moscow's bargaining position vis-à-vis China as Russia grows uncomfortably dependent on the Chinese market. However, Tokyo seems to turn a blind eye to the inconvenient truth that, given Moscow's economic dependence on Beijing and its understandable desire to somehow restore its diplomatic standing vis-à-vis Beijing, the strategic value for Russia of the Northern Territories is actually increasing. This is especially true given China's maritime expansion into the Arctic Ocean. It is therefore unlikely that Japan could resolve the territorial disputes on its term anytime soon. No matter how popular President Putin has been in Russia, Tokyo should not expect him to make big concessions over the territorial disputes.
précis
This, however, does not mean the chance of success will be nil for Japan's bid to take any part of the Northern Territories back. Russia might offer the return of two small southern islands, Habomai and Shikotan, that account for less than 10% of the total geographic area under dispute, just like Moscow did sixty years ago. In fact, while the two countries normalized diplomatic relations in 1956, they failed to sign a peace treaty because Japan was not satisfied with Moscow's paltry offer.
Would Abe be able to convince the Japanese public that the return of the two small islands was the best the Japanese could hope for? If not, Japan would be wise to let sleeping dogs lie. Considering the growing threat from China, however, it still makes sense for Japan to reach some sort of agreement with Russia to stabilize the security environment in the northern area as soon as possible. That way, Tokyo can allocate more military resources in the East and South China Seas. By doing so, it could bide its time on the territorial disputes, waiting for a moment when Russia becomes less dependent on China economically. n
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IPL Helps Fund 13 MIT Projects
The International Policy Lab (IPL) concluded its first institute wide call for proposals this past January. The IPL awarded six fully supported projects ($10,000 plus staff assistance) and seven partially supported projects. Roughly half of these projects address energy and environmental policy, while the rest are equally distributed among international security, biology and health, and big data and privacy policy issues.
MIT-Imperial College London Seed Fund Winners
The MIT-Imperial College London Seed Fund awarded $60,565 to three MIT faculty pursuing joint projects with peers at Imperial College London. The grant primarily supports travel costs for exchange between teams at MIT and Imperial College London with priority given to projects that are new or entering a new phase; that reflect a balanced collaboration between participants; and that involve undergraduate and graduate students as well as early-career scientists. An initiative of the MIT Office of the Associate Provost for International Activities and Imperial College London, the seed fund is administered by MIT International Science and Technology Initiatives (MISTI).
précis
CIS Awards 23 Summer Study Grants
The Center is pleased to announce the recipients of its summer study grants. The grants have been awarded to twenty-three doctoral students in international affairs at MIT. Each will receive up to $3,000 for summer studies, which may be used for fieldwork, archival research, or home-based research and write-up. Criteria for the awards include the importance of the research question, the quality of the research proposal, and strong letters of support.
Gomez, Saraf Receive Infinite Mile Awards
Griselda Gomez and Joli Divon Saraf each received a SHASS Infinite Mile Award. Gomez, the managing director of the MIT-Mexico Program at MISTI, received the award in the category "Great Ideas." Gomez spearheaded the initiative to include a health and safety information session for students going to Latin America.The model was so well received and helpful that it was replicated for all MISTI country programs and is now a core requirement for all MISTI students. Saraf, the assistant director of the Security Studies Program, received the award in the category "Inclusion." Saraf has implemented a number of events that promote workplace community. These events range from informal, impromptu happy hours to the signature formal dinners and award ceremonies that the program runs annually. A nominator noted, "Joli understands that a truly collegiate and inclusive workplace is built on a bit of fun, comfort, friendship and encouragement, which she works tirelessly to provide." In January, SSP Senior Adviser Jeanne Guillemin taught a seminar on "Biosecurity and Bioterrorism" at the University of Oklahoma, Norman, as part of the Oklahoma ScholarLeadership Enrichment Program, a series for academically gifted students sponsored by the Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education.
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M I T C e n T e r f o r I n T e r n a T I o n a l S T u d I e S Blockades were also put in place on the Isthmus of Perekop. Russian armed forces rapidly moved in, using a wide range of groups from naval infantry (marines) to paratroopers and special operations. They came from all different parts of Russia and descended on the peninsula in a coordinated fashion. On February 24, President Putin called snap military exercises that were ostensibly in the northern and central districts of Russia, but not the southern, where Crimea is located. This was almost surely a diversion, since airborne divisions soon began traveling from Pskov to Rostov-on-Don (in the south), to set up a staging ground for shifting planes and transport helicopters for Crimea. The Syrian Express amphibious ship was diverted from its normal route to Syria to deliver 300 special forces, including the newly minted special forces that Putin had ordered in 2012, to Crimea's capital. Road blocks were set up, and transport and gunship helicopters flew in from Rostov to Crimea. In Kerch, jamming equipment was set up so the Ukrainian forces on the peninsula were unable to receive any orders from the new government in Kyiv, which in any event was barely operational after the flight of Yanukovych. By February 28, the main military actions had all been taken with barely a shot being fired.
How was the takeover so bloodless? First, the pro-Russian militias and other paramilitary groups posted checkpoints and supported the work of the military, making the invading force overwhelming for the local Ukrainian forces. Second, the Russian military displayed their own high level of professionalism and training, a result perhaps of the six snap exercises Putin had called in the previous year. Thirdly, while the Ukrainian troops and Ukrainian government had expected trouble from the pro-Russian militias, they had no idea that a full-fledged invasion was imminent. Finally, under the existing agreements concerning the stationing of the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol, Russia was permitted to station a maximum of 25,000 troops, 132 armored combat vehicles, and 24 pieces of artillery at its military facilities in Crimea. The Ukrainian forces serving there had no reason to be surprised to see Russian troops, though they certainly did not expect that those troops would proceed to take over the government of the peninsula.
The question of why the Russian government soon moved from the mostly bloodless military intervention in Crimea to the more complicated and secretive support for the "separatists" in eastern Ukraine is moot. The main theories are that (a) the success of the operation in Crimea led Putin and the Kremlin to keep going, as it were, in the hope that the population of eastern Ukraine would support military intervention because of their pro-Russian sentiments, and (b) that Russian strategists had planned this as another "frozen conflict," perhaps to punish Ukraine for its EU ambitions or to keep it from joining the EU or NATO, since countries with unresolved conflicts are not allowed to join. n
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M I T C e n T e r f o r I n T e r n a T I o n a l S Ford International Professor of History and associate provost Philip S. Khoury has chaired the Bustani Seminar for three decades. "We are so grateful to Myrna Bustani and her family for enabling us to host at MIT some of the world's leading scholars and commentators on the contemporary Middle East," Khoury says. "It has become one of the leading university forums in the US for discussion and debate on the politics and culture of that conflicted region." n
